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Abstract 
Wireless sensor networks are an emerging technology used to monitor an environment over 
time. One specific application of the wireless sensor network is the border security application. 
Researchers have adapted coverage metrics from general wireless sensor network literature to fit 
the border security application. While some of the adapted metrics count the number of sensors 
detecting a potential target, others measure the distance between a potential target and its nearest 
sensor. No existing metric accounts for both of these factors. To take advantage of this gap and 
to attempt to increase the accuracy to which coverage is measured in this application, we created 
the total intersected length metric.  
To test the adapted metrics in comparison to our new metric, we created a MATLAB 
program to simulate a wireless sensor network over time as its sensors fail and its coverage 
degrades. Through experimentation with this model on a notional data set, we can conclude that 
the total intersected length metric used for measuring network coverage for border security WSN 
applications has both advantages and disadvantages when compared to traditional coverage 
metrics. The new metric was found to be advantageous for effectively capturing the initial 
coverage of a network and for determining when a network is no longer sufficiently covered 
while it was found to be disadvantageous for conservatively capturing network degradation and 
for producing quick computation times.  
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1. Introduction 
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are an emerging technology used to monitor an 
environment over time. WSN applications include environmental, industrial, and health 
monitoring; and animal, human, and vehicle tracking [1], [2]. One forthcoming application is in 
the “internet of things,” a network of appliances and devices made smart with the addition of 
sensor nodes and an internet connection [3], [4]. 
A WSN consists of a web of many sensor nodes that collect data and transmit it to one or 
more sink nodes that receive, compile, and process the data before transmitting it to a base 
station [1], [2], [5]. Advanced sensor nodes can detect stimulants such as motion, noise, speed, 
and the size of a passing object [3]. Each node is equipped with sensors, short-range wireless 
communication devices, a processor, and an energy source [2], [3], [4], [6]. WSNs can be 
quickly deployed over large geographical regions, often by plane or missile. This unique 
characteristic allows for applications in inaccessible terrains and makes WSNs perfect for 
military target tracking and security surveillance applications [1], [3]. WSNs also possess self-
organizing and self-reconfiguring capabilities to account for random deployment and changes in 
the network [1], [3], [4], [6]. 
Each node has a limited range of detection. The maximum distance a node can detect is 
called the sensor’s sensing radius, while the area within the sensing radius is called the coverage 
disk, see Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: The diagram of a node, including its sensing radius and coverage disk 
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One of the major challenges associated with WSNs is unreliability. Unreliability is a problem 
because as time passes, sensor nodes are increasingly prone to failure. The most common reason 
for failure is the depletion of battery supply due to expending energy to communicate and collect 
information. Once the battery is fully consumed, nodes are rendered useless [1], [3], [4], [5]. 
Because WSNs are often located among extreme terrain or battlefields, simply replacing low 
batteries is not feasible and redeployment is costly [5], [6], [7]. Many WSN applications require 
effective coverage for months or years [7]; however, many sensor nodes will likely fail during 
this time [3], [4]. This disconnect is called the reliability or fault tolerance issue which works to 
maintain overall network effectiveness as nodes fail over time [3].  
This research is motivated by the border security application in which the WSN is used to 
create a barrier between two regions. To relate our work to the “barrier coverage” literature, we 
now summarise our basic modeling constructs. We assume the WSN is deployed into a 
rectangular border region. The horizontal coordinates of this region reprensent different points 
along the border along which a potential threat might seek to cross the border. The vertical 
coordinate represents the depth of the border region, i.e., the distance a potential threat would 
have to move (undetected) in order to cross the border successfully. Rather than try to model all 
paths through the region, refine our attention to a discrete set of evasion paths in which the threat 
moves (in the direction of the vertical coordinate) directly across the border region (see Figure 
2). We examine metrics for quantifying the extent to which a WSN covers a given evasion path. 
Because an intelligent threat (e.g. a smuggler or attacker) might seek an evasion path that 
exploits an area , we summarize the WSN’s coverage with respect to the least-covered evasion 
path.  
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Figure 2: Five evasion paths through border region 
In what follows, we summarize relevant barrier coverage metrics within the context of the 
modeling construct summarized above. Meguerdichian and Koushanfar employ a minimum-
distance metric that quantifies (under our modeling constructs) an evasion path’s coverage as the 
distance to its nearest sensor node [8]. Saipulla, Westphal, Liu, and Wang adjust the k-coverage 
technique for barrier coverage, quantifying coverage of an evasion path according to the number 
of sensors whose coverage disks intersect the evasion path [9]. The minimum-distance metric is 
believed to consider the distance of the detecting sensor but fail to consider the number of 
separate detections. The k-coverage metric is believed to consider the number of separate 
detections but fail to account for the distance between a sensor and a security threat. To take 
advantage of this gap and to attempt to increase the accuracy to which coverage is measured in 
this application, we created the total intersected length metric. We believe the total intersected 
length metric accounts for both the distance of the detection and the number of separate 
detections by combining both considerations into one measurement. To the best of our 
knowledge, no existing research quantifies coverage of an evasion path as the sum of the regions 
along the evasion path that are detected by a live sensor node.  
2. Methodology 
This section formalizes the three coverage metrics (total intersected length, k-coverage, and 
minimum distance) and our simulation model. Section 2.1 summarizes notation and assumptions 
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for our model and metrics. Section 2.2 defines coverage metrics, and Section 2.3 describes the 
simulation model. Section 2.4 illustrates the methodology for an example WSN modeled 
according to the specifications detailed in previous sections. 
2.1 Notation and Assumptions 
The model includes an initial network, a border region, sensors failing over time, a network 
evolving, and connectivity, as detailed in Figure 3. Line 1 defines the set of nodes N(0) at time 0, 
where 𝑥𝑖 is the x-coordinate of node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁(0) and 𝑦𝑖 is the y-coordinate of node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁(0). Line 
2 defines the set of edges (between pairs of communicating sensors) at time 0, where 𝑟𝑐 equals 
the maximum communication distance between nodes and d[•,•] is the Euelidean distance 
function. In line 3, the border region is defines as the rectangle with corners at (0,0), (a,0), (0,b),  
(a,b). Thus, a is the horizontal distance of the border region and b is the vertical distance of the 
border region. Line 5 defines the x-coordinate of each evasion path. Only the x-coordinate is 
necessary to define an evasion path because paths run vertically through the entire evasion path.  
Each node’s fail time is assumed to be random. We will estimate the average value of each 
metric by applying Monte Carlo simulation. Thus, in order to define the coverage metrics, we 
assume a deterministic failure time 𝑡𝑖 is given for each node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁(0)\{0}. Let 𝑡(𝑖), 𝑖 ∈
𝑁(0)\{0} denote the sorted sensor failure time, i.e., such that 𝑡(0) < 𝑡(1) < 𝑡(2) < ⋯ < 𝑡(𝑛). Line 
6 defines the set of nodes N(t) that survive past time t > 0, called live nodes. Line 7 defines the 
time at which the ith sensor fails. As nodes fail, corresponding edges fail as well, leaving a 
smaller set of edges E(t) still live at time t, represented by line 8. Lines 9 defines the set of nodes 
connected to the sink node. This set can be determined for t > 0 by applying a breadth first search 
algorithm to network (N(t),E(t)).  
  9 
 
Figure 3: Representation of a WSN over time 
As summarized in Section 1, we modeled WSNs with a discrete set of evasion paths running 
vertically through them. We assume the evasion paths’ are equally spaced along the interval 
[0,a]. 
Three coverage metrics are defined with respect to the network’s state at a given time. We 
represent coverage at time s by 𝐾𝑚(𝑡1, 𝑡2, … , 𝑡𝑛; 𝑠) where m ≡ {1, 2, 3} indicates which metric is 
used to measure the network’s coverage. Section 2.2 provides more details on each metric. 
2.2 Coverage Metrics 
Each of the three coverage metrics we used – total intersected length, k-coverage, and 
minimum distance – consider a border region covered under different conditions. When using the 
total intersected length metric, the border region is considered covered as long as all evasion 
paths are detected by live sensors. The distance detected along an evasion path is considered the 
total evasion path length enclosed by live sensors. Similarly, when the k-coverage metric is used, 
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the border region is considered covered as long as all evasion paths are detected live sensors. An 
evasion path is considered to be detected by a sensor if any portion of the path is enclosed within 
the sensor’s detection radius. Lastly, when the minimum distance metric is used, the border 
region is considered covered as long as each evasion path detected by live sensors.  
 
Figure 5: Representation of the total intersected length model 
The total intersected length metric 𝐾1(𝑡1, 𝑡2, … , 𝑡𝑛; 𝑠) is calculated according to the algorithm 
in Figure 5. The algorithm uses a three-dimensional matrix 𝐼𝑒𝑖
𝑔
 (𝑔 = 1,2; 𝑒 = 1, … , 𝑉; 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁(0)). 
The algorithm first determines (in Line 1) the intersection points 𝐼𝑒𝑖
1  and 𝐼𝑒𝑖
2  for each 𝑒 = 1, … , 𝑉 
and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁(0)\{0} by finding the maximum and minimum y-value (with 0 ≤ 𝑦 ≤ 𝑏 so that the 
point remains in the feasible region) such that the point (𝑥𝑒, 𝑦) falls within the coverage disk of 
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node i. However, because two sensors’ coverage disks may intersect an evasion path at the same 
point, computing the total intersected length is not as simple as summing up the length of each 
sensor node’s intersected line segment. The strategy of the algorithm is to adjust the intersected 
points such that no evasion path segment is counted twice in the measurement.  
Lines 2 and 3 multiply both 𝐼𝑒𝑖
1  and 𝐼𝑒𝑖
2  by the connectivity matrix 𝐶𝑖(𝑠), effectively removing 
failed and/or disconnected sensors from consideration by setting their intersection points to zero. 
The line segment [(𝑥𝑒, 𝐼𝑒𝑖
2 ), (𝑥𝑒, 𝐼𝑒𝑖
1 )] now describes the set of points on evasion path e = 1,…,V 
that are covered by a connected sensor 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁(𝑡). Line 4 outlines logic to modify, for a given e = 
1,…,V, the value of 𝐼𝑒𝑖
1  and 𝐼𝑒𝑖
2  for 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁(𝑡) to ensure no point on evasion path e is contained in 
the interior of more than one such line segment. Overlaps occur in five scenarios, as depicted in 
Figure 6. Scenario one occurs when both 𝐼𝑒𝑘
1  and 𝐼𝑒𝑘
2  intersection points fall between 𝐼𝑒𝑖
1  and 
𝐼𝑒𝑖
2  where k > i. In this case, both 𝐼𝑒𝑘
1  and 𝐼𝑒𝑘
2  are set to 0 because all points on evasion path e in 
the segment [(𝑥𝑒, 𝐼𝑒𝑘
2 ), (𝑥𝑒, 𝐼𝑒𝑘
1 )] are also in the segment [(𝑥𝑒, 𝐼𝑒𝑖
2 ), (𝑥𝑒, 𝐼𝑒𝑖
1 )]. The second scenario 
occurs when 𝐼𝑒𝑘
1  falls between 𝐼𝑒𝑖
1  and 𝐼𝑒𝑖
2  and 𝐼𝑒𝑘
1  falls below 𝐼𝑒𝑖
2  where k > i. In this case, 𝐼𝑒𝑘
1  is set 
to 𝐼𝑒𝑖
2  so the points in [(𝑥𝑒, 𝐼𝑒𝑖
2 ), (𝑥𝑒, 𝐼𝑒𝑖
1 )] are now covered only once. The third scenario occurs 
when the exact opposite situation happens, 𝐼𝑒𝑘
2  falls between 𝐼𝑒𝑖
1  and 𝐼𝑒𝑖
2  and 𝐼𝑒𝑘
1  falls above 𝐼𝑒𝑖
1 . In 
this case, 𝐼𝑒𝑘
2  is set to 𝐼𝑒𝑖
1  by similar reasoning. The last scenario is a rare case where both 𝐼𝑒𝑘
1  = 
𝐼𝑒𝑖
1  and 𝐼𝑒𝑘
2  = 𝐼𝑒𝑖
2 . In this case, both 𝐼𝑒𝑘
1  and 𝐼𝑒𝑘
2  are set to 0. Lines 5 and 6 detail a two-dimensional 
matrix of intersected lengths for each node i and each evasion path e. Because of the algorithmic 
work done in Line 4, calculating intersected length for evasion path e is as simple as summing 
the difference 𝐼𝑒𝑖
1 − 𝐼𝑒𝑖
2  over 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁(0). Line 7 calculates the total intersected length by taking the 
minimum intersected length among all evasion paths.  
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Figure 6: Five overlap scenarios found in the intersected length model. The red sensor corresponds with sensor i and the blue 
sensor corresponds with sensor k. 
The k-coverage model, as shown in Figure 7, includes a binary detection matrix, a simple 
algorithm, and a formula for calculating coverage. Line 1 defines the binary detection matrix that 
holds a value of 1 when an evasion e is detected by node i and a value of 0 otherwise. In Line 2, 
values are assigned to 𝐼𝑒𝑖
0  for all e = 1…V and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁(0){0} by comparing 𝑥𝑖 to 𝑥𝑒. If the 
horizontal distance from the center of node i to evasion path e is less than r, then a value of 1 is 
assigned, and otherwise, a value of 0 is assigned. Line 3 calculates the coverage for each evasion 
path e = 1…V by summing the number of nodes 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁(0){0} for which 𝐶𝑖(𝑠) = 1 and 𝐼𝑒𝑖
0 = 1. 
The network coverage 𝐾2(𝑡1, 𝑡2, … , 𝑡𝑛; 𝑠) is then calculated as such value over all evasion paths e 
= 1…V.  
 
Figure 7: Representation of the k-coverage along an evasion path model 
The minimum distance metric, which can be calculated using the algorithm in Figure 8, uses 
the distance 𝐼𝑒𝑖
0  between node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁(0){0} and evasion path e = 1…V. Line 2 calculates the 
horizontal distance between each node and each evasion path. Line 3 details the formula for 
calculating coverage using the minimum distance metric. First, the distance for each evasion path 
e = 1…V is obtained as the minimum value of 𝐼𝑒𝑖
0  away 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁(0){0} with 𝐶𝑖(𝑠) = 1. The 
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network coverage 𝐾3(𝑡1, 𝑡2, … , 𝑡𝑛; 𝑠) is reported as the maximum such distance over all evasion 
paths. 
 
Figure 8: Representation of the minimum distance model 
2.3 WSN Failure Simulation 
To determine the significance of our new total intersected length metric, we created a 
MATLAB program to simulate the failure process of a WSN. In each iteration of the simulation, 
we generate a network topology and a time to failure of each sensor node. Within each iteration, 
we track the three coverage metrics over time. A detailed summary of the simulation follows. 
In each iteration, the simulation first generates an initial network topology defined by 𝑁(0) 
and 𝐸(0). The number of sensor nodes 𝑛 = |𝑁(0)\{0}| is input to the simulation.  The location 
(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖) of each sensor node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁(0)\{0} is randomly and independently selected within 𝐵 
according to a given probability distribution, with the sink node placed directly in the center of B 
for simplicity.  Given (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖), 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁(0), the edges 𝐸(0) are generated as described in Section 
2.1. 
After generating the network topology, the time to failure 𝑡𝑖 of each sensor node 𝑖 ∈
𝑁(0)\{0} is independently generated according to an Exponential(𝜆𝑖) distribution with rate 
𝜆𝑖 = 2
max
𝑗∈𝑁(0)\{0}
{distance from sensor 𝑗 to the sink} 
distance from sensor 𝑖 to the sink
.                                            (1) 
The specific form of Equation (1) was chosen to impose that sensor nodes closer to the sink, 
which are more heavily relied upon to transmit data, tend to fail more quickly than sensor nodes 
that are farther away. The value 2 is not of significance because it simply scales the time-to-
failure by a constant. 
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Next, V evasion paths are generated running vertically within B. The intersection locations 
(𝑥𝑒, 𝑏) and (𝑥𝑒, 0) of each evasion path e ∈ 𝑉 are determined by  
𝑥𝑒 =  𝑒 ∗
𝑎
𝑉+1
.         (2) 
After the network is fully initialized, the times to failure are sorted from smallest to largest as 
described in section 2.1. This sorted list provides a timeline through which the simulation uses to 
model passing time. Beginning with the smallest 𝑡𝑖 and pausing at each 𝑡𝑖, the model progresses 
through time, updating the network and measuring and recording each coverage metric as it goes. 
The process described above is repeated S times, and the output metrics are averaged across the 
𝑆 iterations.  
2.4 Illustration on Notional Network 
 
Figure 9 represents an example in which B = [0,4] × [0,1] includes N (0) = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. 
 
Figure 9: An example WSN at time 0. Five sensors are distributed across border region B and three evasion paths run through 
the region 
The network’s state at time 𝑡0 ≡ 0 is replicated in Figure 9, and the coverage metrics are 
illustrated in Figure 10. The total intersected length metric (shown in green) finds the distance 
between all intersection points at each evasion path and then records the smallest value, 0.2. The 
minimum distance metric (shown in blue) finds the distance between each evasion path and its 
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closest node and records the largest value, 0.2. The k-coverage metric (shown in red) counts the 
number of sensors that each evasion path intersects and records the smallest value, 1. 
 
 
Figure 10: An example WSN is measured using each coverage metric at time 0.  
Suppose node 𝑛5 fails first, i.e., 𝑡1 = 𝑡5. Each metric is recalculated as demonstrated in 
Figure 11. The total intersected length value and the k-coverage values for evasion path 𝑉3 
decrease while the minimum distance value remains the same. Although values change along 
evasion path 𝑉3, the coverage value does not change for any of the three metrics because the 
changed values do not exist on the least covered evasion path.  
 
Figure 11: An example WSN is measured using each coverage metric at time 1. 
Suppose node 𝑛2 fails next. Because d [(𝑥1, 𝑦1), (𝑥3, 𝑦3)] > 𝑟, 𝑛1 becomes disconnected as 
well, see Figure 12. Each coverage metric is updated and, because evasion path 𝑉1 is not detected 
by any live sensors, records a value of 0.  
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Figure 12: An example WSN is measured using each coverage metric at time 2. 
3. Numerical Results  
Using numerical experimentation, we compared and contrasted the three metrics under a 
number of different network designs (i.e., as specified by the probability distribution governing 
the placement of nodes in 𝐵). We specifically investigated how each metric evolves for each 
design as the network degrades. Section 3.1 describes the experimental setup followed by a 
discussion of the results for each metric in Section 3.2 – 3.4 and comparison of each metric’s 
results in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 describes how the results for each metric differ when the 
assumed distance-dependent failure rate is eliminated.  
3.1 Experimental Settings 
Initializing our experiment WSN, we set 𝑛 = 200 within a border region B = [0,10] × [0,1]. 
On the y-axis, sensors were uniformly distributed, and, on the x-axis, sensors were distributed 
according to a truncated normal distribution with mean equal to five and standard deviation equal 
to 𝜎. Sensors were arbitrarily given 𝑟 = 0.5, and communication distance was set to 𝑟𝑐 = 2.0. To 
have enough evasion paths to span B and for the distance between each evasion path to be less 
than r, we set 𝑉 = 50.  
Next, we set up several WSN designs to investivate how nodes should be located in the 
border region. We hypothesized that all of the metrics would prefer for sensors to be more 
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concentratred near the center of the region, e.g., by using a relatively small value of 𝜎 in the 
truncated normal distribution. The rational for this hypothesis is because the sink node is placed 
in the center of the border region; thus, sensors near the edges of the region depend on many 
sensors to communicate with the sink node while sensors near the middle of the region depend 
on far fewer sensors to connect with the sink node. This characteristic makes the sensors near the 
center of the region more valuable to the overall network integrity than the sensors closer to the 
edges [10].  
To determine the most effective distribution, networks were simulated with a variety of 𝜎 
values for the truncated normal distribution. We refer to the networks generated under 𝜎 =
2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, and ∞ as “design SD𝜎,” where SD∞ corresponds to using a 
uniform distribution to locate sensors in the x-direction. In Figure 13, a few of the truncated 
normal distributions are compared to the uniform distribution. 
 
Figure 13: Truncated normal distributions with different σ values compared to the uniform distribution 
We simulated 2000 replications of each design, outputting all three metrics defined in section 
2.2. We used n = 200 sensors in the intial network. We chose n = 200 because we noticed that 
the networks with greater than 200 sensors offered few observable differences while costing 
significantly greater computation times.  
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3.2 Total Intersected Length Metric Results 
The results from measuring coverage using the first metric, total intersected length, were as 
follows. For SD∞, the metric, on average, measured close to full coverage (1 unit after 
normalizing by dividing by the length of an evasion path) for a short period and then dropped off 
steadily until it nears zero when around 40 sensors remained, see Figure 14. The initial coverage 
measure is understood to be the result of a well spread-out network that effectively covered 
every section of every evasion path. As time passed and a number of sensors failed, either fewer 
live sensors covered the least-covered evasion path or sensors along critical pathways failed, 
leaving nodes live but unconnected, or effectively dead. This pattern continued until one evasion 
path was completely uncovered by live and connected sensors. At this point, the metric measured 
coverage to be zero. 
When the network sensors were distributed according to SD2, the metric initially measured 
the network to be less than fully covered (0.7 units) and then dropped off quickly from there, 
with the value nearing zero when around 20 sensors remained, see Figure 14. The initial value of 
around 0.7 is understood to be the result of far fewer sensors being distributed to the edges of the 
network, with the majority of sensors accumulating near the center of the border region. As time 
passed, sensors failed, causing the overall coverage to decrease, but, because there were more 
sensors around the sink to keep far nodes connected, the network degraded slower and 
maintained effective coverage longer, with the value reaching zero with 15 fewer sensors. This 
tradeoff between initial coverage effectiveness and network longevity was observed for each of 
the three metrics.  
In our pursuit of the most desirable distribution according to each metric, we found that no 
one distribution was overall better than all the others. Instead, we observed a wide range of 
tradeoffs. Design SD𝜎 with smaller values of 𝜎 provided worse initial coverage but maintained 
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coverage for longer, and, as the 𝜎 was increased, the initial network coverage grew closer to 1 
and the network remained covered for longer. For total intersected length, maximum initial 
coverage was met as early as SD4, see Figure 14. This means the most significant tradeoffs occur 
when the network standard deviation is four or less, as any distribution with a standard deviation 
greater than four measured as good as or less coverage than SD4. 
 
Figure 14: Total intersected length metric for three different sensor distributions: SD∞, SD4, and SD2  
3.3 K-coverage Metric Results 
The results from measuring coverage using the k-coverage metric were as follows. When 
sensors were distributed according to SD∞, k-coverage measured initially around 12 units and 
then dropped steadily until around 50 sensors remained, see Figure 15. The initial k-coverage is 
understood to be the result of, on average, at least 12 sensors covering each evasion path. As 
time passed, k-coverage decreased until the metric reached a measure of zero units of coverage, 
when around 50 sensors remained live.  
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For design SD2, the metric measured initial k-coverage to be significantly less, with at least 
2.5 sensors covering each evasion path. Unlike k-coverage when the network was distributed 
according to a uniform distribution, the k-coverage at SD2 changed little when the network lost 
its first 100 sensors. At around 100 sensors remaining, k-coverage began to decrease quickly 
until k-coverage was measured to be zero when around 20 sensors remained, see Figure 15. This 
behavior is believed to be the result of few sensors initially covering the outer edges of the 
network, resulting in low initial coverage values, and the majority of failing sensors being 
concentrated toward the middle of the network where sensor failure had little impact of the least 
covered evasion paths near the network edges. Once the sensors near the network edges did 
begin to fail, the network became vulnerable quickly. Interestingly, as seen with the total 
intersected length metric, the network lasted for longer using the SD2 distribution than it did 
when using the uniform distribution.  
As standard deviation was increased, the initial coverage increased, but not until SD8 did the 
coverage metric initially measure the same, 12 units of coverage, as with SD∞, see Figure 15. 
Any increase in 𝜎 beyond SD8 showed little variation in coverage across time. The distributions 
between SD2 and SD8 showed significant tradeoffs between initial k-coverage effectiveness and 
lifetime of the network.  
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Figure 15: K-coverage metric for three different sensor distributions: SD∞, SD4, and SD2 
3.4 Minimum Distance Metric Results 
Unlike the other metrics, the minimum distance starts small and increases over time. Initially, 
for a network with SD∞, the minimum distance was measured at around 0.1 units of coverage, 
see Figure 16. This measurement increased slowly while the first 120 sensors failed and then 
increased dramatically while the remaining 80 sensors failed. The shape of Figure 16 is believed 
to be the result of a well-distributed initial network that degraded across time until around 80 
sensors remained. At this point, the network was no longer considered effectively covered. This 
is because each node has a maximum sensing distance of 0.5 units, and when the minimum 
distance between any evasion path and its closest sensor surpasses 0.5 units, then at least one 
evasion path is left completely uncovered. The measurements beyond 80 sensors remaining 
increase quickly and can be ignored because they are not relevant to this research.  
When the network was set to SD2, the initial coverage value according to the minimum 
distance metric was around 0.25 units of coverage, see Figure 16. After remaining almost 
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constant for a period, the network coverage metric began to increase until when around 50 
sensors remained. At this point, the coverage passed 0.5 units, rendering the network 
insufficiently covered. As with the other coverage metrics, the initial coverage value is worse 
when and the network remains covered for longer when the network is set to SD2 than when the 
network is distributed according to SD∞. 
As with the total intersected length metric, coverage, when the network was set to SD4, had 
the same initial value (~0.1) as the network with SD∞, see Figure 16. Any distribution with SD𝜎 
larger than 4 is going to fail quickly and provide no additional initial coverage. This means that 
the significant tradeoffs within the network occur for designs SD𝜎 with 𝜎 < 4. More coverage 
curves can be found in the appendix. 
 
Figure 16: Minimum distance metric for three different sensor distributions: uniform, normal truncated with a standard 
deviation of four, and normal truncated with a standard deviation of two. 
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3.5 Comparison of the Three Metrics 
It is important to note that all three metrics were output for the same simulated networks. The 
observed differences are not a product of how the network degraded, but rather a difference in 
how each metric interpreted the amount of coverage in the network 
As mentioned previously, we observed tradeoffs between initial coverage and network 
longevity for each coverage metric. For each metric, the SD∞ network showed a better coverage 
than that for SD2, but by the end of the network’s useful life, the network set at SD2 showed a 
greater coverage measure than that for the uniform for each metric. Between these two end 
values exists a point where the coverage is measured the same for both uniform and SD2, see 
Figure 17. This point is where a center-heavy network becomes preferable to a more spread out 
network. For application requiring coverage over long time periods, a more center-heavy 
network might be preferable, but the exact point at which the preferred network type switches 
depends on how coverage is quantified. For the total intersected length metric, this point 
occurred when around 110 sensors remained while for the other two metrics this point occurred 
when around 120 sensors remained. This is interpreted as neither an advantage nor a 
disadvantage of the total intersected length metric, but rather as an interesting finding worth 
noting. While the conventional coverage metrics may agree about the exact point at where the 
distribution type tradeoff occurs, the total intersected length metric and possibly other metrics 
disagree. This finding could be useful information for some problems involving optimizing a 
WSN to maximize coverage. 
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Figure 17: The tradeoff point between a network distributed according to a uniform distribution and SD2 for each coverage 
metric, total intersected length, k-coverage, and minimum distance, respectively 
Another interesting difference among the metrics is how much worse the initial coverage was 
measured to be when the network was set to SD2 as compared to when the network was set to 
SD∞. The total intersected length metric interpreted the least difference between initial 
coverages, with initial coverage being 72% of initial coverage for the uniform when set to SD2. 
Somewhat similarly, initial coverage is 231% of initial coverage for SD2 when set to uniform, 
according to the minimum distance metric. The k-coverage metric interpreted the widest 
variation in initial coverage, with initial coverage being 22.5% of initial coverage for SD∞ when 
set to SD2. Because we know from the total intersected length measurement that an average of at 
least 72% of each evasion path is covered when the network is set to SD2, the dramatic 
difference between the initial coverage when set to SD∞ and the initial coverage when set to 
SD2 according to the k-coverage metric could be considered unrealistic. Because of this, we 
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consider the total intersected length’s method for measuring initial coverage to be an advantage, 
at least over the k-coverage metric. 
Surprisingly, the average point at which each coverage metric interpreted the network as 
insufficiently covered, that is the average value where at least one evasion path is completely 
uncovered, also varied. For the total intersected length metric, the network reached insufficient 
coverage when around 40 sensors remained for the uniform distribution and when around 25 
sensors remained for SD2. According to the k-coverage metric, the network reached insufficient 
coverage when around 30 sensors remained for the uniform distribution and when around 20 
sensors remained for SD2. Lastly, the minimum distance metric interpreted that the network 
reached insufficient coverage when around 85 sensors remained for the uniform distribution and 
when around 50 sensors remained for SD2. Since we do not know when, on average, the 
networks actually became insufficiently covered, we cannot determine which metric most 
accurately captured this. It seems likely that the discrepancy in values in a consequence of using 
averages, which can be easily skewed by a few outliers. The most conservative measurements 
were found by the minimum distance metric. One possible explanation for this is that sometimes 
when a network failed, the next closest sensor was further from the evasion path than r, 0.5 units. 
If this explanation was, in fact, true, then the metric is likely too conservative with its 
measurement. Falling in the middle of the two traditional coverage metrics, the total intersected 
length metric offers a less conservative measurement than the minimum distance metric but a 
more conservative measurement than the k-coverage metric, possibly an advantage of the total 
intersected length metric depending on the application.  
Beyond significant points found on the metric curves, the metrics showed varying rates of 
degradation across time for the SD∞ design, see Figure 18. The total intersected length metric 
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curve showed the majority of the network’s coverage degradation happens between when 140 
and 60 sensors remained. The k-coverage metric curve interpreted the network’s coverage as 
decaying earlier, with the majority of degradation taking place between when 200 and 100 
sensors remained. 
 
Figure 18: The degradation rates for a uniformly distributed network according to each coverage metric, total intersected length, 
k-coverage, and minimum distance, respectively  
The minimum distance metric curve showed a similar degradation patten as the total intersected 
length metric curve, with the majority of its relevant degradation happening when the last 160 
sensors failed. Of the three metrics, the total intersected length metric shows the most coverage 
for the longest period. This tendency to possibly overestimate the coverage of the network could 
be considered a disadvantage of the metric. 
Possibly the biggest disadvantage of the total intersected length metric we found is its 
computation time. Because the k-coverage and minimum distance metrics can be quickly 
updated without having to run time-consuming loops, updating the measures across time is 
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relatively quick. The total intersected length metric, however, requires a triple loop calculation to 
account for sensor overlap every time a sensor fails. As shown in Figure 19, there is minimal 
difference between computation time for the networks when the number of sensors in the 
network is small, but as the number of sensors grows, the computation time for the total 
intersected length metric dramatically outpaces that for either the k-coverage or the minimum 
distance metrics. 
 
Figure 19: Computation time by the number of sensors in the network for each coverage metric 
3.6 Sensitivity to the Assumed Distance-Dependent Failure Rates 
Understanding that our linear distance-dependent failure rate possibly represents an 
exaggerated version of the energy hole created in WSNs, we simulated the model separately 
under the assumption that no distance-dependent failure rate exists, see Appendix 4-6. These 
results suggest that results relating to network design seem to depend on the assumption that 
sensors closer to the sink fail faster. In reality, failure rates likely fall between these two 
extremes; thus, the true results of our metrics likely exist between the results in Appendix 1-3 
and those in Appendix 4-6.  
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4. Conclusions 
Through the results of this research, we can conclude that the total intersected length metric 
used for measuring network coverage for border security WSN applications has both advantages 
and disadvantages when compared to traditional coverage metrics. The new metric was found to 
be advantageous for measuring the initial condition of a network and for determining when a 
network is no longer sufficiently covered while it was found to be disadvantageous for 
conservatively capturing network degradation and for producing quick computation times. Each 
of these findings depends largely on the specific application in which the metrics are used. 
Future research in the border security application will now have a broader selection of 
coverage metrics to choose from and, because of our analysis, researchers can see some of the 
potential tradeoffs of using any of the three metrics. We think this work will allow for more 
complete and helpful research in the optimization of WSNs in the border security application. 
Future work on this topic could include verifying actual network fail time, determining 
additional tradeoffs among the metrics, and speeding up computation time for the total 
intersected length metric. Further analysis could be done using the same MATLAB program we 
created to measure how many sensors remained when each network failed. These data could be 
aggregated to form a fail time distribution along with which the metrics could be compared to 
determine which metric is the most accurate. The computation time for the total intersected 
length metric was minimized in this work, but further research into improving this algorithm’s 
efficiency could help significantly improve the utility of this metric.  
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6. Appendix 
 
 
Appendix 1: Network degradation from 200 to 0 sensors with variable network distributions as measured by the total intersected 
length metric 
 
Appendix 2: Network degradation from 200 to 0 sensors with variable network distributions as measured by the k-coverage 
metric 
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Appendix 3: Network degradation from 200 to 0 sensors with variable network distributions as measured by the minimum 
distance metric 
 
Appendix 4: Network degradation from 200 to 0 sensors when the sensors have no distance-dependent fail rate, as measured by 
the total intersected length metric 
  32 
 
Appendix 5: Network degradation from 200 to 0 sensors when the sensors have no distance-dependent fail rate, as measured by 
the k-coverage metric 
 
Appendix 6: Network degradation from 200 to 0 sensors when the sensors have no distance-dependent fail rate, as measured by 
the minimum distance metric 
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